Note 142

Quote from The Nominalistic Critique (First Part of Website) :

Let us quote VENNIX, A., 1998, Wat is waarheid? (What is truth?), page 147 :

'Aliquid' [( = 'Something' ), this is one of the transcendental notions, along with Unity, Goodness, etc. ] according to St Thomas means as much as 'aliud quid', i.e. another something. For every being is with respect to all other beings another something. Just like ens [ = being ] and res [ = thing ],  unum and aliquid are two sides of the same coin :  in-itself-undivided (indivisum in se) every being is divided-from-the-others (divisum ab aliis)."
Seen in this way every being is indivisum in se and divisum ab aliis. And hence every being is in Thomism an individual (an individuum, according to the classical definition of "an individual"). But in Thomism "every being" not only refers to Substances, but also to Accidents (These are, within this view, to be sure, beings in a weaker degree, but nevertheless still beings). But Accidents are (also according to the view mentioned) not individuals, they just are individual. They are individual in virtue of First Substance of which they are determinations.
From this it seems to follows that the unum (indivisum in se) and the aliquid (divisum ab aliis) cannot refer (both at the same time) to Accidents, and hence Accidents are not beings.
End of Quote

Back to main text